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I. INTRODUCTION
The birth of a healthy, normal child in American society is generally
considered a "blessed event."' This is not always so when the pregnancy
is unwanted or unplanned. Joy is not always followed by the birth of a
child whose mother's pregnancy resulted from a failed sterilization or a
failed abortion because of a physician's negligent act. The abortion or
sterilization may have been sought because of the fear that a pregnancy
would result in a child who might threaten the mother's physical wellbe-
ing or would put a financial strain on the family. Such negligence on the
part of a physician has given rise to the cause of action in tort known as
"wrongful pregnancy".2 Although most jurisdictions presently recognize
IShaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957). In Shaheen, the plaintiff
gave birth to a fifth child as a result of a failed sterilization operation. Id. The
birth of the child was described by the Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court as a
"blessed event" although the plaintiffs husband claimed that the birth of the
fifth child created a financial strain on his family in order for them to live com-
fortably and to be educated properly. Id. This court's opinion reflects American
society's past and still present sentiment regarding child birth and the family.
2 The use of the terms "wrongful life," "wrongful birth," "wrongful conception,"
and "wrongful pregnancy" are distinguishable.
"Wrongful life" refers to a cause of action brought by a child who claims that,
but for the negligent advice to or treatment of the child's parents by the defendant
physician, the child would not have been born. This is usually the case where a
child is born defective or handicapped. Courts have declined to recognize any
cause of action by a child for wrongful life because the child has asserted that he
should not have been born at all and not that he should not have been born
without defects. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A. 2d 689 (1967) (where
the child brought a wrongful life action against the doctor for negligently failing
to warn the pregnant mother of the danger posed to the child as a result of the
mother's rubella).
"Wrongful birth" refers to the cause of action by parents who claim that the
negligent treatment or advice by their physician deprived them of the choice to
either avoid conception or to terminate the pregnancy. In wrongful birth actions,
the resulting child is unhealthy or defective as opposed to wrongful conception
or pregnancy actions which concern the birth of healthy, unplanned children.
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a wrongful pregnancy cause of action as a part of tort law, they differ as
to what damages an injured plaintiff may recover. The jurisdictions which
have addressed this issue have developed several possible theories on the
damages to be recovered in wrongful pregnancy actions.
3
II. JOHNSON V. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS OF CLEVELAND
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently addressed the issue of the
damages in a wrongful pregnancy action.4 In Johnson v. University Hos-
pitals of Cleveland,5 the plaintiff, Ruth Johnson, underwent a tubal lig-
ation for sterilization purposes at University Hospitals which was
negligently performed by three defendant-physicians. As a result, the
plaintiff became pregnant and delivered a healthy baby girl.6 The plaintiff
sought damages for pain and suffering arising out of the pregnancy and
birth for injury to her person caused by the expense of increased care,
and for the work and responsibility involved in raising a child.7 In ad-
dition, the plaintiff sought to recover a sum estimated at three hundred
thousand dollars to cover the cost and expense to care for and raise the
child resulting from the negligence of the defendant-physicians. 8
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n. 1 (D.S.C. 1981). Courts that
permit recovery for this cause of action generally permit damages for the ex-
traordinary expense of rearing an impaired child.
The terms "wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful conception" are synonymous.
(For purposes of this Case Comment, the term "wrongful pregnancy" will be used.).
An action for wrongful pregnancy occurs when a woman gives birth to a healthy,
normal child as a result of a negligently performed abortion, a negligently per-
formed sterilization operation, or following the negligent filling of a contraceptive
prescription. Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 545; Note, Robak v. United States: A Prec-
edent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 Cm. [-]KENT L. REV. 725,
n. 2 (1982). In wrongful pregnancy cases, the parents bring a cause of action
against the physician for damages resulting from the birth of the unplanned
child. It is common in these cases for parents to request a recovery in damages
for rearing expenses of the unplanned child. But courts have barred recovery for
the costs of rearing and educating the child whose birth, the parent's claim,
damaged them. See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wn. 2d 411, 687 P. 2d 850
(1984) (where a unanimous Washington Supreme Court held that child-rearing
costs are not recoverable in wrongful pregnancy actions because it is impossible
to establish with reasonable certainty whether the parents of a normal, healthy
child are damaged); see also Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W. 2d 738 (Tenn. 1987)(where
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that in a wrongful pregnancy action, costs
of rearing a healthy, normal child, as a result of a failed sterilization are not
recoverable).
s The four theories of recovery of damages in wrongful pregnancy actions are:
(1) no recovery of damages, or the "blessing" concept. See infra notes 21-40 and
accompanying text; (2) the benefits rule which balances the benefits and injuries
of the resulting birth. See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text; (3) limited
damages rule, which allows recovery of damages based on actual out-of-pocket,
pregnancy related damages. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; (4) full
recovery of damages. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
4 Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49 (1989).
5Id.
6 Id. at 50.
7Id.
8Id.
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The plaintiff's medical claim was submitted by the Court to a medical
arbitration panel. 9 The court instructed the panel that if they found any
defendant liable, damages could include:
1) Reasonable medical and hospital costs incurred by plaintiff and re-
lated to the prenatal care of plaintiff, the cost of the delivery and
post-delivery medical and hospital care related to the birth of the
child;
2) Pain and suffering of plaintiff, if any, resulting from the pregnancy
and delivery of the child;
3) Reasonable medical and hospital expenses incurred by plaintiff and
related to any subsequent sterilization procedure;
4) Reasonably foreseeable expenses to be incurred by the parents in
maintaining, supporting, and educating the child to the age of ma-
jority, offsetting such expense by the economic value to the parents
and the family of the child's love, aid, comfort, and society which
will benefit the parents for the duration of the parents' lives.... .o
The arbitration panel recommended a finding in favor of the plaintiff and
one of the defendant-physicians. However, the panel found that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to child-rearing costs and assessed all damages at
twelve thousand five hundred dollars.1' Consequently, the plaintiff ap-
pealed the arbitration award and obtained a trial de novo. She settled all
of her claims for damages with the defendants except her claim for child-
rearing costs.
At trial, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that Ohio law does not recognize a claim for wrongful
pregnancy, and that the plaintiff may not recover for child-rearing ex-
penses for a healthy, normal child to the age of majority. 12 As a result,
the plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which held
that Ohio recognizes a claim for wrongful pregnancy, but limited the
plaintiff's recovery to "damages arising from the pregnancy itself...,
i.e., delivery fees, prenatal care, loss of spousal consortium and services
during pregnancy, and pain and suffering during pregnancy and child
birth, etc."'I3 The court stated that a parent is not injured by the birth of
a normal, healthy child. The recovery of costs of raising a child were
deemed to be too speculative and impossible to weigh. Furthermore, the
recovery of such costs might harm the child emotionally and psycholog-
ically if the child were to learn that she was unwanted before birth. The
plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
After considering the four theories for recovery of damages in a wrong-
ful pregnancy action 14 and reviewing the duty on the part of the plaintiff
9M.
10Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
"Id. at 51.
'4 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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to mitigate damages, either through abortion or adoption, 15 the Supreme
Court ruled that in wrongful pregnancy actions, Ohio recognizes the "lim-
ited damages" rule as the theory for recovery which limits the damages
to the pregnancy itself.16 Justice Andrew Douglas explained the court's
decision by reasoning that Ohio's public policy provides that the birth of
a normal, healthy child cannot be considered an injury to the parents. 17
Because Johnson is a case of first impression in Ohio, the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in considering the damage issues, reviewed the four pos-
sible theories of damages which other jurisdictions had considered. After
careful analysis of the four theories of recovery, the court held that the
plaintiff could recover limited damages18 as a result of the negligent
sterilization performed by the defendants which resulted in the birth of
a healthy, normal child. Therefore, Ohio recognizes both a cause of action
for wrongful pregnancy and a recovery for the injuries directly related
to the pregnancy, but not for the "so called injury" of raising a healthy,
normal child to the age of majority. In other words, the economic injury
of raising and educating a healthy, normal child born subsequent to a
failed sterilization operation is not a foreseeable consequence flowing
directly and proximately from the tortfeasor's negligence and thus, a
proper element of damages.19 It should be noted that a majority of juris-
dictions have also refused to grant recovery for child-rearing expenses
for a healthy, normal child as an element of compensable damages in a
wrongful pregnancy action.
20
,1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §918(1) (1979) (" 'Avoidable Conse-
quences':... [Olne injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages
for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or ex-
penditure after the commission of the tort.").
1, Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58 (1989).
Limited damages may include but are not limited to, medical expenses and loss
of consortium during the pregnancy and birth, emotional distress during that
time, the mother's lost wages during a reasonable length of time, and the mother's
pain and suffering during the pregancy and childbirth, but the cause of action
does not include child-rearing expenses. Id. at 58.
,7 Id. at 58-59.
18 See infra notes 65-71 and accomDanving text.
19 See PROSSER & KEETON, LAw OF ToRTs §43, §298 (5th ed. 1984): "A defendant
is not to be liable for consequences which, when looking backward after the event
with full knowledge of all that has occurred, would appear to be "highly extraor-
dinary." Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, §435(c)(1979); cf. Washington Rail-
road Co. v. Cooker, 81 Ill. App. 660, affid, 83 Ill. 223, 55 N.E. 693 (1989); Wallin
v. Eastern Railway Co., 83 Minn. 149, 158,86 N.W. 76, 79 (1901); Butts v. Anthis,
181 Okl. 276, 73 P. 2d 843 (1937)("all consequences which a prudent and expe-
rienced person, fully acquainted with the circumstances which in fact existed...
would at the time of the negligent act have thought reasonably possible if they
had occurred to his mind").
2 It should be noted that the plaintiff in Johnson asserted that, in Ohio, all
tortfeasors are responsible for all reasonable foreseeable damages that are caused
directly or proximately from their negligence. This tort principle is applied to all
negligence cases, even those cases concerning negligently performed sterilizations
where the foreseeable damage flowing from the unplanned pregnancy is the eco-
nomic injury of raising and educating the child to the age of majority. But many
jurisdictions have rejected the plaintiffs argument for child-rearing costs in
wrongful pregnancy actions. These jurisdictions and cases which reject child-
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III. THE "BLESSING" CONCEPT
Historically, when cases of wrongful pregnancy were first brought in
the state courts, no recovery was allowed. 2' The earliest case to address
the problem of damages in a wrongful pregnancy action was Christensen
v. Thornby.22 In Christensen, the plaintiff, after undergoing a vasectomy
2 3
because he feared that another pregnancy would endanger his wife's
health, was considered by the court to be "blessed with the fatherhood of
another child"24 when his wife gave birth to a healthy child as a result
of the failed sterilization operation. In this case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiffs claim for damages because the expenses
alleged were too remote from the purpose sought for the sterilization
operation. 25 The court reasoned that instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff
had been blessed with another child.
2
rearing expenses as a matter of law include: Alabama: Boone v. Mullendore, 416
So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Arkansas: Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d 568
(Ark. 1982); Delaware: Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A. 2d 8 (Del. 1975); District of
Columbia: Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A. 2d 1073 (D.C. App. 1984);
Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F. 2d 1544 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
Florida: Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. App. 1980), pet. denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981);
Georgia: White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D.Kan. 1981); Indiana: Gar-
rison v. Fox, 486 N.E. 2d 5 (Ind. App. 1985); Illinois: Cockrum v. Baumgartner,
477 N.E. 2d 385 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied; Raja v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical
Center, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (Ill. App.
1979); Iowa: Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W. 2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Kansas: Byrd v.
Wesley Medical Center, 699 P. 2d 459 (Kan. 1985); Kentucky: Schork v. Huber,
648 S.W. 2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App.
1981); Maine: Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A. 2d 810 (Me. 1986); New Hampshire:
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A. 2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); New Jersey: Berman v. Allan,
404 A. 2d 8 (N.J. 1979), rev'd in part, Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A. 2d 755 (N.J. 1984);
New York: O'Toole v. Greenberg, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 143, 477 N.E. 2d 445 (1985);
Delaney v. Krafte, 470 N.Y.S. 2d 936 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1984); Weintraub v. Brown,
470 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (A.D. 2 dept. 1983); Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 300 (A.D. 4
Dept. 1980); North Carolina: Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E. 2d 743 (N.C. 1986);
Pennsylvania: Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 453 A. 2d 974 (Penn.
1982); Texas: Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W. 2d 869 (Tex. App. 1982); Terrell v.
Garcia, 396 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). Virginia:
Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E. 2d 301 (Va. 1986); Washington: McKernan v. Aasheim,
687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); West Virginia: James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E. 2d 872
(W.Va. 1985); Wisconsin: Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W. 2d 242 (Wis.
1974); Wyoming: Beardsley v. Weidsma, 650 P. 2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). (Also cited
in the Court of Appeals Eighth Judicial District Cuyahoga, County, Ohio Brief
of the Defendant-Appellee in Appendix ).
21 See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957). It should be noted that presently Penn-
sylvania and Minnesota recognize a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy; see
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977); see also Szekeres v.
Robinson, 715 P. 2d 1076 (Nev. 1986)(where the Nevada court presently refuses
to allow any recovery for wrongful pregnancy).
22 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
- A vasectomy is "a method of sterilization involving the surgical excision of
a part of the vas deferens." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1572 (2d ed. 1982).
Christensen, 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 662.
25 
Id.
26
Id.
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In another early case, Shaheen v. Knight,27 a Pennsylvania Common
Pleas Court addressed the issue of damages in a wrongful pregnancy case
where the plaintiff underwent a vasectomy operation because he wanted
to limit the size of his family as the birth of a child would be a financial
burden.28 However, as a result of the failed sterilization operation, his
wife became pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child. The
damages sought by the plaintiff were for the expenses of rearing and
educating the child.29 The court ruled that "to allow damages for the
normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment
of the people. °3 0 The court explained that if such damages were allowed,
the physician would have to pay for the fun, joy, and affection which the
plaintiff and his wife would experience during the rearing of their fifth
child.31 The court justified its holding by stating that many people would
be willing to support this child if they were given the opportunity32 and,
therefore, allowing such damages would violate public policy.33
Recently, the Nevada Supreme Court in Szekeres v. Robinson34 adopted
the "blessing concept" form of recovery when a healthy child is born as
a result of the negligence of a physician. The state of Nevada is presently
the only jurisdiction to adhere to the theory that the birth of a normal
child is "an event which, of itself, is not a legally compensable injurious
consequence even if the birth is partially attributable to the negligent
conduct of someone purporting to be able to prevent the eventuality of
childbirth."35 The court reasoned that a negligence action may not be
maintained unless the parent has suffered injury or damage. Thus, in
wrongful pregnancy cases, the birth of a healthy, normal child is not
legally compensable because the birth of a healthy child cannot be con-
sidered an injury or damage to the parents.3 6 In essence, the Szekeres
court supported the public policy that a parent cannot be said to be dam-
aged by the birth of a normal and healthy child. If the parents did not
suffer injuries, the Nevada Court concluded that they may not recover
any damages as a matter of law.37
The Johnson court looked to the reasoning of the Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, and Nevada courts3 which denied the recovery of any damages
resulting from wrongful pregnancy, but the Ohio Court denied such com-
pensation by use of a different theory of recovery. For example, the other
courts barred any recovery of damages because it was against public policy
to award damages for an event which is in reality a blessing and not an
27 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
1 Id. at 41-42.
29 Id. at 45.
SI1d.
31 Id.
32d.
mId.
' 715 P. 2d 1076 (Nev. 1986).315 Id. at 1078.
T Id. at 1077.
37 Id.
ISee Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1926); see Shaheen v. Knight,
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957); see Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W.
620 (1934).
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injury.3 9 Ohio, on the other hand; recognized that the plaintiff-parents
were in fact injured but denied recovery because such an award to a
parent for the birth of a child would tend to lesson the value of human
life and the value of preserving the institution of the family.
40
IV. THE BENEFITS RULE
The Johnson court reviewed the benefits rule41 which attempts to bal-
ance the policy of compensation for the individual tort victim with the
broader social values attached to the place of the family in American
society. Basically, the benefits rule allows recovery for child-rearing ex-
penses by weighing the economic cost or expense of raising a child against
the benefit or worth of the child's companionship, comfort, and aid to the
parents.42 In other words, by granting these damages, courts have rec-
ognized that an "uninterrupted claim of causation is established between
the failure of the sterilization procedure due to the defendant's negligence
and the foreseeable consequences of the conception and birth of a child.
'43
In Johnson, the Ohio Court considered the Minnesota court decision of
39 Shaheen, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 45-46.
40 See HANDLING PREGNANCY AND BIRTH CASES 106 (W.H. Wimborne ed. 1983)
(citations omitted). This still ignores the fact that the parents were wronged by
the negligence of their physicians, and because of their injuries, they must incur
more expenses than they had expected. The parents are now faced with medical
costs during the pregnancy and child birth and after the pregnancy for lost wages
and for the care of the child including food, education, medical and miscellaneous
expenses until the child reaches the age of majority.
41 REsTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §920 (1979) summarizes the tort benefit
rule: "When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable." Id.; see, e.g., Hartke
v. McKelway, 707 F. 2d 1544, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983, 104 S. Ct. 425, 78 L.Ed.
2d 360 (1983)(where the plaintiff underwent a negligent sterilization operation
which resulted in the birth of a healthy, normal child. The court held that the
district court properly allowed the benefits of child-rearing expenses to be offset
against the expenses thereof, but not against those expenses for the pregnancy
and childbirth. In this case, the plaintiff bore a healthy child, however, she had
a sterilization for therapeutic purposes and there were possible dangers to her
health resulting from pregnancy and childbirth.); see Phillips v. United States,
508 F.Supp. 544 (1981)(where the court hoted in a wrongful birth case that any
benefits derived from the defendant's negligence may properly be offset against
the detriments which flow from that conduct); see University of Arizona v. Superior
Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P. 2d 1294 (1983) (where the court in a wrongful preg-
nancy case held that the proper measure of damages was past and future pecu-
niary and nonpecuniary expenses incurred by the parents, less a deduction for
any pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits that the parents would receive by virtue
of having a healthy child).
42 See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A. 2d 429, 436 (Md. App.
1984).
- Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W. 2d 738, 743 (Tenn. 1987).
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Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic," (which overruled Christensen) where the
benefits rule was applied. In Sherlock, the plaintiffs brought an action
for compensable damages for the birth of their eighth child, a normal and
healthy child, as a result of a negligently performed sterilization oper-
ation. 45 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful
conception, compensatory damages may be recovered by the parents of
unplanned children.46 The court adopted the benefits rule and awarded
the plaintiffs damages for the costs of child-rearing expenses offset by
the value of the benefits conferred to them by the child.4 7 Although the
economic burden of child-rearing was outweighed by the longterm benefits
of parenthood, the court reasoned that it would be myopic to declare that
these benefits would exceed these costs as a matter of law.4 The court
further justified its holding by recognizing the growing acceptance of the
family-planning concept as an integral part of the modern marital re-
lationship by the use of birth control methods and the constitutional right
to limit procreation. 49 The court added that the "time-honored command"
to "be fruitful and multiply" has not only lost contemporary significance
to a growing number of potential parents but is contrary to public policies
that encourage family planning.50 The Minnesota Court's reasoning is
contrary to the reasoning set forth in the "blessing concept" theory of
recovery where to allow damages for the birth of a healthy child is foreign
to the popular sentiment regarding children and the family.51
The Johnson court also considered the Maryland decision, Jones v.
Malinowski,52 which adopted the benefits theory of recovery of damages
in an action for wrongful pregnancy. In Jones, a negligently performed
sterilization resulted in the birth of a healthy child.3 The court found
that traditional tort principles were applicable to wrongful pregnancy
actions and stated that they must be considered against the worth of the
child's companionship, comfort, and aid to the parents.54 Moreover, these
benefits must be considered in light of the circumstances in the particular
case, particularly taking into account the expense of rearing and edu-
cating the child, family size, the family income, the motivation factor for
sterilization, and the age of the parents. 55 The court justified its position
"260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977)(overruling Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Min.
123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934)).
4Id. at171.
4Id. at 170.
47 Id. at 176.
4Id. at 175.
-9Id.
10 THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 51 (109th Ed., 1989).
Statistics conclude that families are smaller than they used to be because people
are having less children. In 1970, 9.8% of families had four or more children,
while in 1987, 2.7% of all families had four or more children. In 1970, 18.2% of
all families had one child, while in 1987, 21.3% of all families had one child. Id.Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 52 (1989).
52 299 Md. 257, 473 A. 2d 429.
Id. at 260, 473 A. 2d at 430.
Id. at 272, 473 A. 2d at 436.
Id. at 272, 473 A. 2d at 436-37; see also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1971).
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by stating that "[t]he parents seek damages, not because they do not love
and want to keep the unplanned child, but because the direct, foreseeable
and natural consequences of the physician's negligence has forced upon
them burdens which they sought and had a right to avoid by submitting
to sterilization.."5 6 Basically, the Jones court requires the jury or fact
finders in such cases to offset the economic costs of child-rearing with the
intangible benefits of love and support.
The Johnson court also looked to the Supreme Court of Arizona's rea-
soning in University of Arizona Health Services Center v. Superior Court,57
where the Arizona Supreme Court criticized the benefits rule, but at the
same time, was strongly in favor of it. The court stated that its role was
to "leave the emotion and sentiment to others and attempt to examine
the problem with logic and by application of the relevant principles of
law."58 The Arizona court held that the preferable rule was the benefits
rule where the trier of fact must consider both pecuniary and non-pe-
cuniary elements of damage which concern the rearing and education of
the child. Furthermore, the trier of fact must also consider the question
of offsetting the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits which parents will
receive from the parental relationship with the child.59
V. FULL RECOVERY
California is the only state which permits full recovery of child-rearing
expenses in wrongful pregnancy cases. Thus, the decision in Custodio v.
Bauer,60 supports the full recovery theory.6 1 Custodio involved an action
for the recovery of damages resulting from the birth of a healthy, normal
child as a result of a failed sterilization operation. The plaintiff underwent
a sterilization operation because she already had nine children and she
was told that a sterilization operation would improve her physical con-
dition. The California Court of Appeals concluded that the birth of a child
is considered to be the sole foreseeable consequence of a failed sterilization
Id. at 270, 473 A. 2d at 436.
17 136 Ariz. 579, 581, 667 P. 2d 1294, 1296 (1983) (where the plaintiff, after
having three children, underwent a vasectomy operation because he and his wife
sought to limit the size of their family for financial reasons; the sterilization
operation was negligently performed and, as a result, the plaintiffs wife became
pregnant and gave birth to another child).
11 Id. at 584, 667 P. 2d at 1299.59 Id.
60 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
61 However, it should be noted that several courts contend that Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,356 N.E. 2d 496 (1976), permitted recovery of all damages
in a case concerning the birth of an unplanned, healthy child. However, the
Johnson court held that Bowman did not address the measure of damages re-
coverable in a "wrongful pregnancy" case. Johnson v. University Hospitals of
Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49 (1989). The Bowman case involved a negligent tubal
ligation which resulted in the birth of twins where one child was born normal
and the other was born impaired. See Id. The Bowman court found that this was
not an action for wrongful life, but rather was a traditional negligence action.
Id.
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procedure. The court stated that if a "change in a family's status can be
measured economically, it should be as compensable as the [other]
losses. '62 The California Court, in its holding, applied the general tort
principles of negligence that the victim is entitled to full recovery if the
injury is foreseeable and proximately caused by negligence, in this case,
the failed sterilization performed by the negligent doctor. Citing Prosser
and Keeton in Law of Torts, the court observed that proximate cause is
"merely the limitation which courts have placed upon the actor's respon-
sibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct."n As Prosser and
Keeton explained, "[als a practical matter, legal responsibility must be
limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and
of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon
the basis of some social idea of justice or policy."6 Prosser and Keeton
further stated that this limitation is associated with the nature of the
connection between the defendant's acts and the events of which the
plaintiff complains but to a greater extent, the legal limitation on the
scope of liability is associated with policies which are inadequately ex-
pressed ideas of what justice demands.65 Therefore, California's policy is
to expand the boundary of liability beyond that of other jurisdictions that
have faced the issue.
VI. LIMITED DAMAGES AND THE JOHNSON ANALYSIS
The Johnson court recognized the concept of limited damages which
includes out-of-pocket and direct expenses, pregnancy related expenses,
including such items as lost wages, medical expenses, cost of a future
sterilization operation, loss of consortium and comfort, and damages for
the pain and suffering endemic to pregnancy and childbirth.6 6 The Ohio
Court did not allow any recovery for child-rearing expenses.
By adopting the recovery theory of limited damages,67 the Johnson court
suggested that the birth of a healthy, normal child is not a legally com-
pensable wrong and, therefore, child-rearing expenses which arise there-
62 Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323-324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. However, the
law in California on this issue seems to be unsettled. A subsequent California
case, Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.Rptr. 652 (1976), adopted the
benefits rule theory of recovery in a wrongful pregnancy case; see supra notes 41-
58 and accompanying text.
- PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS §41, §264, (5th ed. 1984).
Id.
-Id.
- See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); see also Fulton-DeKalb
Hosp. Authority v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E. 2d 653 (1984); see also Garrison
v. Foy, 586 N.E. 2d 5 (Ind. App. 1985); see also Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A. 2d
810 (Me. 1986); see also Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d 103 (1982);
see also McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P. 2d 850 (1984); see also
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E. 2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
67 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; see infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
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from are not legally compensable damages. The Johnson court established
that the common law of Ohio does not recognize the recovery of child-
rearing expenses in a wrongful pregnancy case.68 If the Ohio court had
recognized these damages in a wrongful pregnancy action, it is said that
it would be converting this action into a wrongful life cause of action.69
Therefore, because the plaintiff in Johnson sued in wrongful pregnancy,
the Ohio court awarded the mother damages for the pregnancy itself.
These damages may include, but are not limited to: emotional distress
during the pregnancy and birth; medical expenses and loss of consortium
during the pregnancy and birth; the mother's lost wages during a rea-
sonable period of time; and the mother's pain and suffering during the
pregnancy and child birth.70 The Johnson court concluded that it was not
the role of the Supreme Court of Ohio to establish the law in- wrongful
pregnancy cases. 71 Rather, it is the role of the General Assembly to es-
tablish guidelines "in which the competing social philosophies involved
in 'wrongful pregnancy' actions should be considered in establishing the
law. 7
2
- It should be noted that the plaintiffs argument is that the issue in this case
is the same as the issue in Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E. 2d 496
(1976). In Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 51-52, 57, the court found, however, that
this was an erroneous claim on the part of the plaintiff, because Bowman did not
address what damages were available in a wrongful pregnancy action. Bowman,
48 Ohio St. 2d at 44, 356 N.E. 2d at 498. In addition, other jurisdictions have
also mistaken Bowman as being a wrongful pregnancy action which permits full
recovery for the costs of child-rearing and educating a normal, healthy child. See
McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 415-416, 687 P. 2d 850, 853 (Wash.
1984) (where the Washington court stated that Bowman permited full recovery
of the costs of rearing and educating a normal, healthy child); see also, Miller v.
Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 186, 343 S.E. 2d 301, 306, n. 2 (Va. 1986) (where the Miller
court, realizing the error in McKernan, stated that the Bowman court "expressly
declined to rule on the issue of whether damages should be limited to the expenses
directly resulting from the pregnancy because that issue was not properly before
the court"); see also Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P. 2d 459
(Kan. 1985); see also Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E. 2d 5 (Ind. App. 1985). Byrd and
Garrison also recognized the error in McKernan.
I See supra note 2. This argument can be criticized because even if child-
rearing expenses were allowed in wrongful pregnancy actions, such actions would
not be converted into wrongful life causes of action because they still remain very
different. Wrongful life involves the suit by a child against the doctor who neg-
ligently treated the child's mother during pregnancy and, as a result, caused
physical injury to the child when the child is born handicapped or defective. See
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A. 2d 689 (1967). In wrongful pregnancy
cases, the claimant is the mother of the child who sues the physician for failure
to perform a sterlization operation where the mother consequently gives birth to
a normal, healthy child. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545, n.
1 (D.S.C. 1981). If wrongful pregnancy cases permitted recovery for child-rearing
expenses, these differences would continue to remain between these theories of
recovery.
70 See Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58
(1989).
71 By changing the law, the court meant to change the law of damages in
wrongful pregnancy cases in order to allow such damages as child-rearing ex-
penses.
72 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59.
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The Johnson court rejected the no recovery rule embodied in the bless-
ing concept because it is "clearly in conflict with the traditional concept
of tort law."73 Ohio tort law follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which sets forth the four elements necessary to establish a plaintiffs
burden of proof in a negligence action.74 These elements include: (a) the
existence of a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to a
certain standard of conduct; (b) failure of the defendant to conform thereto;
(c) that such failure is the legal cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff;
and (d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally
compensable by damages. 75 The Johnson court found a prima facie case
of negligence in favor of the plaintiff because all of the foregoing elements
were present. Therefore, damages were awarded to the plaintiff for the
injury caused by the physician's negligence, i.e., the pregnancy and re-
sulting birth of a child. By the time the case was brought before the
Supreme Court, the plaintiff had already been compensated for her wrong-
ful pregnancy. In the court's view, her remaining claims were considered
to be the equivalent of an action for wrongful life. 76 To avoid the confusion
between actions for wrongful life with those for wrongful pregnancy, the
Johnson court did just as other courts have done, "equat[ed] the condition
of the pregnant plaintiff with the life of her child ... It is the fact of the
pregnancy as a medical condition that gives rise to compensable damages
and completes the elements for a claim for negligence [for wrongful preg-
nancy]. '77 By contrast, if damages were not recoverable, the plaintiff
would not be compensated for damages for pregnancy as a medical con-
dition because the theory does not permit a parent to "recover in tort for
such an event because the constituent element of the tort of negligence,
namely damages, is not present. ,, "78 In contrast, the Nevada court in
Szekeres 79 justified its position in support of the no recovery rule by in-
dicating that the birth of a child is a "blessed event." The Nevada Court
did not take into account the wrongness or injuriousness of the birth
event as other jurisdictions8° have recognized.
73 d. at 58.
74RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, §328A (1965).
75 d.
76 It should be noted that many jurisdictions argue that when a plaintiff in a
wrongful pregnancy action claims damages for child-rearing expenses, the allow-
ance of such damages would be converting the action for "wrongful pregnancy"
into an action for "wrongful life." See, e.g.,Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E. 2d
743 (N.C. 1986); but see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
7 Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 111, 337 S.E. 2d 528, 534 (1985).
78 Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P. 2d 1076, 1079; see supra notes 21, 34-37 and
accompanying text.
79 d.
- The Szekeres court is claiming that when damages are awarded for the
normal birth of a healthy child, courts are taking birth and life for granted and
not treating it as a "blessed" and "joyous" event. By adopting the no recovery
rule, the Nevada court is expressing its belief that "normal birth" is not a wrong,
it is a "right." Id. at 1078.
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A. Speculative Damages
The Johnson court rejected the full recovery rule8l and the tort benefits
theory82 of recovery of damages in a wrongful pregnancy case because
these concepts violate traditional tort and public policy principles. The
majority ofjurisdictions have avoided the public policy issues of awarding
expenses for rearing a healthy, normal child and have held that such
damages cannot be awarded because they are too speculative as a matter
of law.8 The Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon traditional tort prin-
ciples to deny child-rearing costs and held that "[diamages which cannot
be established with reasonable certainty are speculative or conjectural
and may not be recovered."' As the Virginia Court stated, "who, indeed,
can strike a pecuniary balance between the triumphs, the failures, the
ambitions, the disappointments, the joys, the sorrows, the pride, the
shame, the redeeming hope the child may bring to those who love him? '8 5
The law of Ohio, in contrast to the Virginia court, prohibits the award
of damages that are based upon speculation and are uncertain86 and,
therefore, child-rearing expenses may not be awarded. The Johnson court
cited Coleman v. Garrison,7 where the court stated that to place a price
tag at birth on the cost of a person's life is an "exercise in prophesy" 8,
and not something that the jury is trained to determine.8 9 The Coleman
court suggested that the judgment for recovery of child-rearing costs
"might be applied at the end of life, after it has been lived and when the
facts are identified." ° However, such a recovery would be useless because
the parents and the child would be dead and, therefore, would be unable
to be compensated. But the dissent in Johnson reasoned that child-rearing
expenses may be measured. In fact, the dissent by Justice Herbert Brown
claimed that it is far less speculative to estimate the costs of rearing a
child than to measure the other damages in such tort cases.91 In Justice
Brown's opinion, damages that are more speculative include "[p]ain and
81 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
Davidson, Torts-Wrongful Pregnancy-Ordinary Costs of Raising Healthy
Child Not Recoverable, TENN. L. REV. 153 (1987).
4 Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 187, 343 S.E.2d 301, 307 (Va. 1986); see also,
Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N. C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986) (adopting the
Miller rationale). Other earlier cases that reached the same rationale include:
McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P. 2d 850 (Wash. 1984); Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S. 2d
300 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1980); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A. 2d 8 (Del. 1975).
SId.
See Swartz v. Steele, 42 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5 (Cuy. Cty. 1974) (where the Ohio
Appellate Court held that "[t]he general rule for compensatory damages is that
the injury, and the damages resulting, must be shown with certainty, and not
left to conjecture or speculation"); see also Day v. Gulley, 175 Ohio St. 83 (1963);
Also cited in the Court of Appeals Eighth Judicial District Cuyahoga County,
Ohio Brief of Defendant-Appellee pp. 19-20.
87 349 A. 2d 8 (1975).
T Id.
89 Id. at 12.
'OId.
91 Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 59.
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suffering, damage for the injury itself, loss of consortium, loss of earning
potential, and even future medical expenses. 19 2 But if child-rearing ex-
penses are broken down into what is involved day in and day out in
raising a child, it would be almost impossible to find damages that could
be more speculative than one based on calculations of:
food, clothing, education, medical and miscellaneous expenses
of rearing a child, ... financial benefits to be received from a
child throughout a lifetime and particularly in old age .... the
tangible benefits of parenthood - love, affection, companion-
ship, achievement, etc., and then balance and offset all of these
factors to predict the overall benefit or loss achieved in a life-
time. The formula is further complicated by the allowable de-
fenses of mitigation (abortion, adoption) and the mechanics of
administering such an award.93
B. Other Public Policy Considerations
In addition to the prohibition on awarding damages based upon spec-
ulation and uncertain damages, there are several other public policy
considerations that were relied upon by the Ohio court in Johnson. The
Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the other public policy principles
which excluded the recovery of child-rearing costs:
(1) A parent cannot be said to be damaged by the birth of a
normal healthy child; (2) Child-rearing expenses will be a wind-
fall to the parents, wholly disproportionate to the doctor's culp-
ability; (3) Recovery should be denied to protect the mental
and emotional health of the child; (4) Damages for a 'wrongful
pregnancy' action should not include child-rearing costs since
to allow damages would be the equivalent of allowing damages
in an action for 'wrongful life'.94
The first public policy ground, that "[a] parent cannot be said to have
been damaged by the birth of a normal, healthy child,"95 represents the
92 Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A. 2d 429, 436 (Md. App. 1984).
Brief of Defendant-Appellee in the Court of Appeals Eighth Judicial District
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, p. 20.
94 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 55-56; see also Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center,
237 Kan. 215, 221-222, 699 P. 2d 459, 465 (Kan. 1985). The Supreme Court of
Kansas summarized the public policy principles that exclude child-rearing costs
as damages:
(1) A parent cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and
rearing of a normal and healthy child; (2) Benefits of joy, companion-
ship and the affection which a healthy child can provide outweigh the
costs of rearing that child; (3) The recovery of child-rearing costs would
be a windfall to the parents and an unreasonable burden on the neg-
ligent health care provider, wholly out of proportion to the culpability
of the physician; (4) Recovery should be denied to protect the mental
and emotional health of the child, sometimes described as an 'emo-
tional bastard' who will one day learn that he or she not only was not
wanted by his or her parents, but was reared by funds supplied by
another person. Id.
99Id. at 55.
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opinion of many jurisdictions that the birth of a healthy normal child
does not constitute a legal harm from which recovery for child-rearing
expenses will lie.96 For example, in Terrell v. Garcia,7 the court stated
that "the satisfaction, joy, and companionship which normal parents have
in rearing a child make such economic loss worthwhile. These intangible
benefits, while impossible to value in dollars and cents, are undoubtedly
the things that make life worthwhile."9 The dissent, in Johnson, claimed
that the majority decision not to award child-rearing expenses to the
plaintiff penalized her, although she had made a lawful choice to limit
the size of her family by having a sterilization operation." The dissent
further declared that the plaintiff was penalized when denied child-rear-
ing costs because the physicians who performed the sterilization operation
were negligent, and the birth of her child was a proximate cause of such
negligence. The injury to her, Justice Brown claimed, was an economic
one that was a direct and proximate cause of the negligence.
The Johnson dissent followed the same rationale that was utilized in
Custodio v. Bauer,'° ° which stated that "[wihere the mother survives with-
out casualty there is still some loss. She must spread her society, comfort,
care, protection, and support over a larger group. If this change in the
family status can be measured economically it should be as compensable
as the former losses."'0 1 But what the Johnson dissent failed to recognize
is that the law does not provide a remedy for all perceived wrongs. "[Tihe
birth of a normal child is not a civil wrong for which the court will provide
a remedy in the form of an action for damages... [T]he birth of a normal,
healthy child is not [a] 'legally compensable damage' in tort.'1 2 The plain-
tiff in Johnson was not penalized, according to the majority's view, be-
cause the negligence of the physicians causing the birth of a healthy,
normal child, does not constitute an injury.0 3 The injury suffered must
be a legally compensable injury in order for a plaintiff to recover damages
in a traditional negligence action. While the birth of the child and the
resulting child-rearing expenses may be consequences of the failed ster-
See, e.g., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E. 2d 743 (N.C. 1986);
see, e.g., Byrd. v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215,699 P. 2d 459 (Kan. 1985);
see, e.g., Fulton v. De-Kalb Hosp. Authority v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E. 2d
653 (Ga. 1984); see, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 69 Ill. Dec. 168,
447 N.E. 2d 385 (111. 1983); see, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d
1084 (Fla. App. 1980) pet. for review denied (Fla. 1981), 399 So. 2d 1140; see, e.g.,
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
"1496 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974)(where
the plaintiff gave birth to her fourth child as a result of a negligent sterilization
operation and claimed it posed a financial burden on her family; she sought the
sterilization operation to avoid the financial strain).
18 Id. at 128.
" See Griswold v. Connecticutt, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
101251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
101 Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
102 Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P. 2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1926).
103 Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58 (1989).
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ilization operation, this does not establish allowable damages that are
legally compensable and recoverable wrongs.1 04 Therefore, the Ohio court
recognized that it is against public policy to award damages to a parent
for wrongful pregnancy because even though the child or the birth is
unwanted, the birth of a human being in our society is not a legal injury.
Even the earlier case which dealt with this issue and which recognized
that the birth of the child involved an economic injury, concluded that
the birth of a child is a blessing.0 5
Furthermore, the public policy issue that the "[blenefits of joy, com-
panionship, and the affection which a healthy child can provide, outweigh
the costs of rearing that child"''10 recognizes that:
[it is a] matter of universally-shared emotion and sentiment
that the intangible but all-important, incalculable but inva-
luable 'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere
monetary burdens involved... On a more practical matter, the
validity of the principle may be tested simply by asking any
parent the purchase price for that particular youngster. 10 7
Many courts justify this reasoning by claiming that the economic loss.
experienced by parents make it all worthwhile. 08
The Texas Appellate Court in Terrell summed up the entire public policy
issue by raising the following question: "Who can place a price tag on a
child's smile or the parental pride in a child's achievement?" 10 9 The court
continued by concluding that public sentiment recognizes that these in-
tangible benefits to the parent outweigh any burden of economic expense
104See Byrd. v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 225, 699 P. 2d 459, 468
(Kan. 1985) (where the Kansas court held that "[t]he birth of a normal healthy
child may be one of the consequences of a negligently performed sterilization, but
we hold that it is not [necessarily] a legal wrong for which damages should or
may be awarded").
-o See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); see Sha-
heen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
106Byrd, 237 Kan. at 221, 699 P. 2d at 465 .
117 Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86.
1o8 See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 927 (1974); see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511; see
Hays v. Hill, 47 S.W. 2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1972).
"o Terrell, 496 S.W. 2d at 128. It should be noted that courts do exactly this
in wrongful death of children cases. Wrongful death statutes provide that an
action be maintained for "any wrongful action, neglect or default" which causes
death. Recovery for wrongful death is allowed for intentional and negligent torts.
Welch v. Creech, 88 Wash. 429, 153 P. 355 (1915). In these cases, damages are
awarded to the individual beneficiaries who are compensated "for the loss of the
economic benefit which they might reasonably have expected to receive from the
decedent in the form of support, services or contributions during the remainder
of his lifetime if he had not been killed." PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS §127,
§949 (5th ed. 1984). But these damages awarded for wrongful death of children
actions can be justified because these cases involve compensation for the death
of a child while in wrongful pregnancy cases, the child is not dead, but is healthy
and normal. Id.
[Vol. 4:1
RECOVERY OF LIMITED DAMAGES
that the child might cost to the parent. 10 , " But an argument consistent
with the Custodio decision can be made that "the emotional injury to the
child can be no greater than that to be found in many families where
'planned parenthood' has not followed their blueprint."' 12 The dissent in
Johnson reasoned that the issue in the case is not whether the plaintiff
loves her child and wants to keep her. On the contrary, the plaintiff has
accepted the inevitable and wants to raise her child and give the child
love but claims that she has had burdens pushed upon her that she sought
to avoid by submitting to a sterilization operation." 3 Although public
policy finds such a cause of action by a parent of a child who seeks child-
rearing expenses for the child's upbringing to be inhumane, Judge Pear-
son, in his dissent in Public Health Trust v. Brown, 14 found that the
result reached by a court which denies child-rearing expenses to a parent
in the name of "humaneness", is "inhumane". Justice Pearson says:
I see nothing humane in denying a parent the wherewithall
which might save a child from deprivation or, in many cases,
abject poverty. I see nothing humane in a rule of law that could
enhance the already dire need of parents and existing siblings.
I see nothing humane in a decison which effectively immunizes
physicians from their negligence and victimizes a mother who
sought to relieve herself and her family from the additional
burden of another child." 5
But if public sentiment accepted Justice Pearson's reasoning, the worth
of a child's existence and even the worth of human life would not be
considered the greatest priority to preserve and protect in our society.
Parents who sued in wrongful pregnancy would be demonstrating in court
"not only that they did not want the child but that the child has been of
minimal value or benefit to them. They will have to show that the child
remains an uncherished, unwanted burden so as to minimize the offset
to which the defendant is entitled.""' 6 "In a proper hierarchy of values
the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting
it. Respect for life and the rights proceding from it are at the heart of
our legal system and, broader still, our civilization."' 7
110 Id.
"I Consider the following quotes: "Call me anything you want, but don't ever
call me a bad mother;" "Believe me, I live for my children;" "The kids? Well, they
are our whole life." These are the kinds of comments that are frequently heard
coming from parents who care. They are expressions of the love, concern, dedi-
cation, and sacrifice that accompany the role of parent. Every good mother and
father has said these things or thought them often. J. PROCACCINI & M. W. KIE-
FABER, PARENT BuRNouT introduction (1983).
12 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477
(1967).
113 See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 270, 473 A. 2d 229, 235-36 (Md. App.
1984) (where the court said that: "[t]he parents seek damages not because they
do not love and want to keep the unplanned child, but because the direct, fore-
seeable and natural consequences of the physician's negligence has forced upon
them burdens which they sought and had a right to avoid by submitting to
sterilization.").
114 388 So. 2d 1084.
115 Id. at 1087.
116 Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E. 2d 385, 390 (Ill. 1983) cert. denied.
117 Id. at 389.
1989-901
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Another issue considered by the Ohio Court is if recovery were to be
granted, "ec]hild-rearing expenses [would] be a windfall to the parents,
wholly out of proportion to the doctor's culpability."18 Thus, the Court
recognized that to burden a physician with the expenses of child-rearing
for a child who is being reared by his parents is, in essence, the equivalent
of a medical paternity suit. Furthermore, this burden is disproportionate
to the physician's liability, especially in light of the benefits retained by
the parents who have the joy of raising their child. "To hold the physician
responsible for the cost of future care of a healthy normal child based
upon the parents' private decision on how to accept the unplanned preg-
nancy is to inflict a penalty on the defendant that is out of the all pro-
portion to his wrong."1 9 In other words, if the Johnson court were to allow
the plaintiff to recover child-rearing expenses from the physicians until
the age of majority of the child, the plaintiff would retain the benefits of
having her child while the physicians would pay huge expenses for the
child's upbringing. In essence, the plaintiff in Johnson would enjoy every
benefit of parenthood without paying for any of the financial costs of the
child. This is completely out of proportion to the culpability of the phy-
sicians who were negligent in failing to prevent the resulting pregnancy.
The Wisconsin Court, in Reick v. Medical Protective Co., held that:
[tlo permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire
costs of its upbringing to a physician ... would be to create a
new category of surrogate parent [namely, the negligent phy-
sician]. Every child's smile, every bond of love and affection,
every reason for parental pride in a child's achievements, every
contribution by the child to the welfare and well-being of the
family and parents, is to remain with the mother and, father....
On the other hand every financial cost or detriment.., would
be shifted to the physician who allegedly failed to timely di-
agnose the fact of pregnancy.12°
In addition, if child-rearing expenses were recoverable in wrongful preg-
nancy actions, the physicians who usually perform the sterilization op-
erations might be reluctant to perform such procedures because they or
their insurance carrier would not want to shoulder such costs if the op-
eration were unsuccessful causing the birth of a child.1 21
11' Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 55 (1989).
'19 Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 300, 303 (App. Div. 1980).
120 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518-19, 219 N.W. 2d 242, 244 (Wis. 1974).
121 There is a crisis in medical malpractice. Medical malpractice insurance has
increased sharply and, as a result, women in a number of states no longer have
access to obstetrical services. Nye, Gifford, Webb, Dewar, The Causes of the Med-
ical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company
Finances, 76 GEO. L.J., 1495, 1496 (1988). Cited in the law review from H. Jonas,
Representing the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Aug. 13,
1986) (statement prepared for Hearings on H.R. 2695 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Gov't Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); hearing was can-
celled and statement never delivered); cf. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, on release of 1985 survey of 1,400 obstetricians and gynecologists,
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Referring to another public policy consideration, the Ohio court de-
clared that "[r]ecovery should be denied to protect the mental and emo-
tional health of the child ...-122 This impacts upon the psychological
anguish experienced by the child who has learned that he or she is an
unwanted child. The child, an innocent party to the suit because he or
she now has knowledge of the circumstances that preceded his or her
birth, has been harshly characterized as an "emotional bastard.'1 23 This
public policy argument opposes the benefits rule of recovery. 124
In order to assess the proper liabilities and benefits of both the economic
and emotional factors in wrongful pregnancy cases, what is required is
testimony of the harm suffered by the parents as a result of being forced
to raise the child. As the Illinois Court stated: "permitting recovery, then
requires that parents demonstrate not only that they did not want the
child but that the child remains an uncherished, unwanted burden so as
to minimize the offset to which the defendant is entitled."'125
conducted in June and July of 1985 (availability of obstetrical care is likely to
suffer because family physicians in some communities can no longer afford lia-
bility insurance to cover obstetrics and because of the increasing number of phy-
sicians giving up obstetrics and cutting down on high risk obstetrics)(unpublished,
copy on file at GEO. L. J.). Imagine if the plaintiff in Johnson had given birth to
triplets; the physicians would have had to pay for the upbringing of the children
until the age of majority.
But in the past few years, critics have blamed the malpractice crisis on the
contingency fee system. Note, Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Kansas Re-
sponse to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L. J. 566, 595-96. Almost
all plaintiff attorneys use this system in medical malpractice cases and usually
receive a rate of 33 1/3% of the recovery. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and
Welfare, (Pub. No. (1050) 73-88), Medical Malpractice: Report of the Secretary's
Commission on Medical Malpractice 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice]. Under the contingency fee sys-
tem, the attorney receives a certain percentage of the money awarded to the
plaintiff if he or she wins the cases. If the attorney loses the case, the attorney
is not compensated. Therefore, the plaintiff suffers almost a monetary loss by
hiring an attorney to argue his case. "Critics of the system argue that the con-
tingency fee method of compensation encourages plaintiffs to file suits that other-
wise would not be filed." Note, Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Kansas
Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L. J. at 566, 595 (dis-
cussing whether attorney's fees should be required regardless of whether the
attorney wins or loses the case. The United States Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare found that many doctors blame "greedy attorneys" who use
the contingent fee system and accept non-meritorious cases, and then, in order
to receive a higher award, magnify the nature of the injuries of their clients.
Report of Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice at 32. In addition, critics
argue that what contributes to the increased malpractice insurance premiums is
the cost of defending such suits. Note, Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Kan-
sas Response to Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L. J. 566, 595. They
further contend that this system awards the attorneys with a higher percentage
and, therefore, leaves the plaintiffs without adequate compensation. Conse-
quently, this triggers juries who realize this, to inflate their verdicts. Id.
112 Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 56.
123 Id.
14 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
115 Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E. 2d 325, 390 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied; see
also Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (App. Div. 1983); see also Public
Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. App. 1980), pet. denied, 399 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 1981).
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In order to suceed in a wrongful pregnancy case and receive as large
a recovery as possible, a parent seeking to recover child-rearing expenses
for an unplanned child will be strongly tempted to denigrate the child's
value. 126 In other words, parents would be encouraged and indeed re-
warded for denying the value of their child's life in open court. The John-
son court reasoned that the parents cannot "pretend to know what the
future may hold [for the child] and neither may the jury!"127 Furthermore,
the traditional jury's function is to be a factfinder, rather than a fortune
teller. Yet, juries frequently calculate costs such as these in wrongful
death cases and even in personal injury cases. 128 The court explained that
it is not in the business of deciding the value or placing price tags on a
child's benefit to his or her parents.129 If parents downgrade their child
and explain that the cost of raising the child is not worth it, then they
will receive an even larger recovery.130 Therefore, it would be beneficial
to parents to disparage the value of their children in order to receive as
large a recovery as possible. "An unhandsome, colicky or otherwise 'un-
desirable' child would provide fewer offsetting benefits, and would there-
fore presumably be worth more monetarily in a 'w,'ongful conception'
case."'1 31 This would undermine society's need for a strong and healthy
family relationship. 132 Our society is too advanced to dismiss the emo-
tional effects on the child when parents, in open court, minimize the value
of their child in order to receive a larger monetary award for the unwanted
birth of their child.
The final public policy principle which the Johnson court considered
to support the prohibition on the recovery of child-rearing costs is that
to allow such damages would be the equivalent to allowing damages in
an action for "wrongful life." Wrongful life claims are brought by or on
behalf of the child for the harm of being born deformed. 33 These suits
are brought by children who are born as a result of failed sterilizations.
216 Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A. 2d 1073, 1076 (D. C. App. 1984).
127 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58 (1989).
128 Id. at 59.
2 Id. at 58.
130 Id.
131 Public Health Trust, 388 So. 2d at 1086.
132 Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W. 2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982). In
Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P. 2d 459 (Kan. 1985), the
court adopts the reasoning of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Wilbur, that if the
child in a wrongful pregnancy case learns that his parents went to court because
he was not originally wanted and because he was a mistake, the child will be
emotionally harmed. The public policy reasoning behind this consideration, as
the court explained, is that this will "undermine society's need for a strong and
healthy family relationship." Wilbur, 275 Ark. at 243-44, 628 S.W. 2d at 568; See
also Boone v. Mellendore 416 So. 2d at 723; see also Flowers v. District of Columbia,
478 A. 2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. App. 1984).
'3 PROSSER & KEETON, LAw OF TORTS §55, §370, (5th ed. 1984), see also supra
note 2 which explains the difference between wrongful life claims and wrongful
pregnancy claims.
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The Johnson court, relying upon Bowman v. Davis,13 4 disapproved of ca-
tegorizing a "wrongful pregancy" action as a "wrongful life" action. The
plaintiffs' claim in Johnson before the Supreme Court of Ohio was for
damages arising from the life of the child. Therefore, these claims are
the equivalent of an action for wrongful life. The Ohio court does not
recognize wrongful life suits because they "force courts to weigh the value
of being versus nonbeing .... ,,135 Therefore, the plaintiff has already been
compensated for her wrongful pregnancy and seeks recovery before the
Supreme Court for wrongful life. If the court permitted damages for child-
rearing costs, such damages would convert an action for wrongful preg-
nancy into an action for wrongful life. 13 6
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY ISSUE
The constitutional right to privacy played a role in the Ohio court's
decison to reject the no recovery concept in wrongful pregnancy actions.
Although a normal birth in our society is considered a "blessed event,"'137
it is a violation of a woman's fundamental right to privacy under the
Constitution of the United States to prevent her from having a sterili-
zation operation. 3 By permitting a doctor to perform a tubal ligation, a
woman is exercising her fundamental right to privacy because she is
choosing to limit the size of her family by using means to prevent con-
ception. When a doctor negligently performs the procedure, it can be
argued that in order to avoid the pregnancy, the mother can abort the
fetus. But to require a mother to abort her fetus in order to mitigate
damages can indirectly be considered a violation of her fundamental
constitutional right to privacy. In other words, the mother is compelled
either to give up her child forever or to keep the child, and thus be
burdened with the extra expense of a child. Therefore, the mother is forced
to make one of these two decisions, although she had previously exercised
her fundamental right to limit the size of her family.
134 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (1976). In Bowman, the plaintiff gave
birth to twins as a result of a failed sterilization operation. One of the twins was
born mentally retarded and suffered from some physical ailments and malfunc-
tions. In this cause of action, the Ohio court did not address damages in a wrongful
pregnancy action because the action brought by the plaintiff was one for medical
malpractice. The defendant in Bowman interpreted the cause of action by the
plaintiff as one for wrongful life. No where in the Bowman opinion is there a
discussion of whether child-rearing expenses are compensable when raising a
healthy normal child. Id.; see also Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E. 2d 301, 306, n. 2
(Va. 1986); .see also Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 699 P. 2d 459, 462 (Kan.
1985); see also Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E. 2d 5, 8, n. 3 (Ind. App. 1985).
135 Id. at 45, n. 3.
"-
6 Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 181-82,347 S.E. 2d 743,48-49 (1986).
137 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
138 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Together these cases hold that
a woman's choice not to procreate is a constitutional guarantee under the right
to privacy.
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Conversely, it has been argued that the refusal to recognize the birth
of a normal, healthy child as a compensable wrong does not interfere
with a person's right to have a sterilization operation to prevent preg-
nancy.1 39 In other words, the jurisdictions which have decided actions for
wrongful pregnancy, have not interfered with the plaintiffs' right to a
sterilization operation and, therefore, Griswold v. Connecticut,140 Roe v.
Wade,14 ' and Doe v. Bolton14 have no relevance. 43 These cases would only
be relevant if the denial of child-rearing expenses would infringe upon a
woman's right of procreation or would be a threat to family stability. But
in Johnson, the circumstances are such that the plaintiff chose to limit
her family size by having a sterilization operation, which is a constitu-
tional fundamental right. The plaintiff was not required by law to keep,
abort, or even adopt the child. In essence, no state action interfered with
the plaintiffs decision to be sterilized. Nor does such a denial of child-
rearing expenses threaten family stability. In fact, it promotes family
stability by protecting the child who was subsequently conceived. By
preventing the recovery of child-rearing expenses, the Ohio court is pro-
tecting the child's mental and emotional health.'" In addition, the state
will provide benefits to parents who cannot support an additional child.
Accordingly, in Johnson, the plaintiff should be compensated for those
damages directly flowing from the pregnancy itself because the physicians
should pay for the injuries directly caused by the pregnancy under tra-
ditional negligence tort law. Therefore, Ohio disagreed with the Nevada
court which concluded, in Szekeres, that child birth is "an event which,
of itself, is not a legally compensable injurious consequence even if the
birth is partially attributable to the negligent conduct of someone pur-
porting to be able to prevent the eventuality of childbirth.'' 4 5
VIII. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
The issue of whether child-rearing expenses should be awarded to the
plaintiff in Johnson implicates another issue; that is whether the doctrine
of avoidable consequences is to be considered when a plaintiff, who be-
comes pregnant as a result of a negligent sterilization operation, fails to
mitigate damages by abortion or adoption. The avoidable consequences
doctrine requires that the plaintiff make reasonable efforts to minimize
damages. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "one injured by
the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that
he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after
39 See Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Nev. 1926).
140 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
' See Szekeres, 715 P. 2d at 1078; see also Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 477 N.E.
2d 385, 390 (Ill. 1983) (where the court reasoned that Griswold v. Connecticutt
and Roe u. Wade have no relevance "to the issue of whether damages may be
recovered under the circumstances here for expenses after the birth of the child").
1" See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
145 ld.
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the commission of the tort."' 6 But the avoidable consequences doctrine
is not applicable when the means necessary to avoid the damages or lessen
them are unreasonable.1 4 7 It also is not appropriate when application of
the doctrine would be against public policy. 1'
In Johnson, the plaintiff could have avoided the burdens of parenthood
and of rearing her unwanted child to the age of majority by having an
abortion or by placing her child for adoption. Therefore, she would be in
the same position that she was in before the negligent sterilization op-
eration. She would be freed from having to spend eighteen years of her
life to rear her child, and she would also be freed from the burden of
litigating a law suit on such an intimate, personal, and controversial
issue. The defendants, in Johnson, contended that if the Ohio court
adopted the tort benefits rule of recovery, 149 the trier of fact, when con-
sidering the award of damages, would have to consider whether the par-
ents could have mitigated their damages by either abortion or adoption. 150
They further argued that if the parents were to choose neither to abort
nor adopt, the jury, when calculating child-rearing expenses must take
this lack of mitigation into account. 15 1 Thus, some courts hold that under
the torts benefits rule contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
where the plaintiff in a wrongful pregnancy case fails to mitigate damages
by abortion or adoption, it can be assumed that the parent benefited from
the birth of the child, although it was a result of the negligence of a
physician.152 In addition, these courts also reason that if parents did not
mitigate their damages through abortion or adoption, it would be against
public policy to award the parents damages because they would be ben-
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §918(1) (1979).
141 See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E. 2d at 392 (where the court found
that the decision not to conceive a child is totally separate from the decision to
abort or place a child for adoption. These choices cannot be forced on parents as
a form of mitigating damages because it would be highly unreasonable to do so);
see also Trovpi v. Scarf. 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W. 2d 511, 520 (Mich.
App. 1971)(where the court found that the emotional and mental trauma of forcing
a parent to mitigate damages by use of abortion or adoption is unreasonable).
-, See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (where
the court found that to force a parent to abort or adopt in order to mitigate damages
in a wrongful pregnancy action is against public policy and against the private
choice of planning a family); see also Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 324,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (where the court said 'The suggestion in Shaheen - that
the child be considered as worth its cost or put up for adoption is not consistent
with the very stability of the family." The court further held that it is unreasonable
to require adoption or abortion to minimize damages because of its negative effect
on family stability.).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §920 (the tort benefit rule states that
"[w]hen the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damage, to the extent that this is equitable").
15 Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 57 (1989).
is' Id.
152 See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A. 2d 757 (Del. 1974) (where the Delaware
Court said "[i]t is such retention of benefits- the parents keeping their child, and
the seeking to transfer only the financial costs of its upbringing to the doctor-
that is a relevant factor in evaluating the public policy considerations involved").
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efited by the birth of their child and benefits are not recoverable as a
matter of law. In Shaheen, the court stated that:
[t]o allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the
physician would have to pay for the fun,joy, and affection which
[the] plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating
of this, defendant's fifth child. Many people would be willing
to support this child were they given the right of custody and
adoption, but according to [the] plaintiffs statement, [the]
plaintiff does not want such. He wants to have the child and
wants the doctor to support it. In our opinion to allow such
damages would be against public policy.'
But the Johnson court stated that as a matter of law, a parent is not
required in a wrongful pregnancy case to mitigate damages by abortion
or adoption. It concluded that abortion or adoption are not "reasonable"
efforts to diminish or avoid prospective damages like child-rearing ex-
penses.15 4 The court followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts principle
that a tort victim has no duty to make unreasonable efforts to mitigate
damages.' 55 The Illinois Court, in Cockrum, stated that it would be un-
reasonable to expect a mother to abort or place her child for adoption
because of the maternal affection she has developed for the child, even
though she was negligently impregnated. 15
Guido Calabresi, in his book, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law:
Private Law Perspective on a Public Problem,"7 addressed the issue of
reasonableness as applied to the plaintiff and her husband in Troppi v.
Scarf.158 The key issue which Calabresi focused upon is the claim that
the plaintiff and her husband had failed to act reasonably to mitigate
damages after conception. 1" 9 The defendant asserted that he may be liable
15 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 46 (1957).
1-Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 57-58
(1989).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §918(1) (1979) (stating that "one injured
by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he
could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the com-
mission of the tort").
156 Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 I1. 2d 193, 447 N.E. 2d 285 (Ill. 1983), cert.
denied; see also Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W. 2d 361, 866 (Ky. 1983) (where the
court said "[t]he best instincts of the child, and the natural instincts of the parent,
make it unreasonable to require parents to submit the child in the womb to
abortion, or the child in the crib to adoption"). Cited from Jones v. Malinowski,
299 Md. 257, 271, 473 A. 2d 429, 438 (Md. App. 1984).
157 G. Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives
on a Public Law Problem (1985) [hereinafter Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the
Law].
158 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971). -Troppi involved a couple who
wished to have no more children because they could not afford any more. The
couple went to a doctor who prescribed birth control pills. When they received
the pills from the pharmacist, however, he gave them tranquillizers. The woman
became pregnant and, consequently, sued the pharmacist for the cost of child-
rearing expenses. Id.
,59 See Ideals, Beliefs, and Attitudes of the Law, supra note 154 at 53.
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for the pregnancy but not for the costs of child-rearing because the plain-
tiff could have mitigated her damages by abortion. But the couple's an-
swer to the defense was that "while their beliefs were involved, people
in their position should not be induced to violate such reasonable beliefs
by threats of huge beneficial burdens."'16 0 Calabresi looked to the reaction
of the court in Troppi, which found that the defendant "took his victims
as he found them, according to their beliefs."' 6'11 The couple, in Troppi,
had a right to "believe" that abortion and adoption were not the proper
alternatives for them, while other couples in their same situation may
believe that mitigating damages through these methods was the correct
action to take in such a situation. In other words, as Calabresi stated,
"[a] reasonable person is not, as a matter of law, required to have an
abortion or to give up a child for adoption, however much these may be
acceptable alternatives for other reasonable people.'1 62 Therefore, the
Troppi court held that the defendant may not induce the plaintiff and
her husband to act against their beliefs by claiming that they failed to
mitigate damages. In effect, it was established that the reasonably pru-
dent person can act upon her own beliefs.
In his analysis, Calabresi accused the Troppi court of making "shreds
of" the scientific approach to reasonableness and replacing it with beliefs
that are deemed reasonable. 16 3 Calabresi explained that the reasonable
prudent person is not the scientific person who lessens damages regardless
of the harm it does to ones beliefs or faith. In other words, as explained
in terms of the Learned Hand test, "at least some beliefs count in the
balance of harms and benefits which define reasonable prudence, and
some [like those in Troppi] not only count, but, as a matter of law, tip
the scales almost regardless of what is on the other side."' But this poses
an important question as to which beliefs or moralisms are to be given
weight. To find the answer to this question, we are required to distinguish
between reasonable and unreasonable.' To make this distinction, a court
would then be forced to establish that beliefs which are deemed to be
acceptable are reasonable, while other beliefs, regardless of whether a
person considers them reasonable and regardless of that person's right
to believe them, would be deemed unreasonable. If this approach were
used in Johnson, the court would be forced to conclude that the plaintiff
failed to act reasonably because her beliefs are unreasonable and, as a
result, she must. bear the burden of the physician's mistake. Therefore,
the defendant, in Johnson, by declaring that the plaintiff's failure to
mitigate damages contributed to her injury, would have induced the plain-
tiff to act against her beliefs that abortion and adoption were not ac-
ceptable alternatives although other reasonably prudent persons would
consider abortion and adoption acceptable.
160Id.
"" Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 240, 187 N.W. 2d at 520.162 See Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law, supra note 154, at 53.
1 Id. at 53-54.
164Id. at 54.
165 d.
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Consistent with Calabresi's analysis, the Johnson court stated that
abortion and adoption are personal choices which should not be forced
upon parents. 16 Since Roe v. Wade, there has been an increasing social
emphasis on a woman's right to the exercise of freedom of choice as to
whether to have an abortion or keep her child. 16 7 A woman still experi-
ences pressure from society to feel guilty if she seeks an abortion, although
she has exercised her right to privacy under the United States Consti-
tution to live her life as she chooses without the interference of the beliefs
of others. 16
In considering whether the plaintiff in a wrongful pregnancy action
should be required to mitigate damages, the court must also consider the
psychological impact on a mother or even a father to be forced to either
bear the burden of raising an unwanted child or live with the guilt and
the other psychologicial effects that result from aborting a fetus or placing
a child for adoption in order to receive an award in damages for negli-
gence. The court in Troppi v. Scarf found that adoption was an unrea-
sonable means of minimizing damages because the hazards of adoption
would damage the parent as well as the child. 169 The Michigan Court
stated that:
even though parents may not want to rear the child they may
conclude that the psychological impact on them of rejecting the
child and placing him up for adoption is more detrimental. A
child will not be taken from his mother without her consent
unless the child is neglected or a mother is unfit.... The moth-
er's right to keep the child is not dependent upon whether she
desired the conception of the child. 70
To suggest that a plaintiff mitigate damages by abortion would involve
the court in a highly complex and volatile social issue which has not yet
been resolved in this country.'1
7
IX. CONCLUSION
In Johnson, the Court followed the traditional negligence principles
that a failed sterilization leads to foreseeable injuries due to a resulting
pregnancy. Cases of wrongful pregnancy implicate a medley of consid-
erations which include: an unwanted child; an unwanted pregnancy; a
potential windfall to a physician who negligently performs a sterilization
operation if damages are not awarded, as opposed to a windfall to parents
16Id.
' Sayre, Abortion or Adoption: A Rational Application of the Avoidable Con-
sequences Rule to the Computation of Wrongful Conception Damages, 12 W. STATE
U. L. REV. 785 (1985).
168 Id.
169 Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511, 512 (1971).
170 Id. at 259, 187 N.W. 2d at 420. Cited from Sayre, supra, note 164, at 786-
87.
17 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
[Vol. 4:1
1989-90] RECOVERY OF LIMITED DAMAGES 109
if they receive full recovery. In addition to these factors, there are the
constitutional and social issues of privacy, abortion and adoption, not to
mention the deeply felt personal beliefs about these matters.
The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the traditional and neutral prin-
ciples of negligence rather than engage in a balancing and weighing of
these factors. Apparently, the Court in its wisdom opted for the concept
of limited damages because it is a traditional, safe and the least contro-
versial of the various theories of damages.
LiZA F. COHEN

